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ABSTRACT 
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, National Personal Protective Technology 
Laboratory, has undertaken a study to determine how well self-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs), deployed in 
accordance with Federal regulations (30 CFR 75.1714), hold up in the underground environment with regard 
to both physical damage and aging.  This report presents findings regarding laboratory-tested SCSRs in the 
seventh phase of testing from May 1999 to August 2000.  The SCSRs were tested on human subjects and on 
a breathing and metabolic simulator.  The results indicate that most of the apparatus, if they pass their approved 
inspection criteria, perform satisfactorily.  The deployed CSE SR-100s, however, exhibited significantly higher 
inhaled carbon dioxide (CO2) levels than new units, as they did in the previous two phases.  Several Draeger 
OXY K-Pluses that rattled when shaken were found to have potassium superoxide (KO2) particles throughout 
the breathing circuit, including the mouthpiece.  Draeger investigated the problem and developed a shake test 
to detect damaged units.  The durations of new Ocenco M-20s were statistically significantly longer than those 




On June 21, 1981, U.S. coal mine operators were required to 
make available to each underground coal miner a self-contained 
self-rescuer (SCSR). The regulations (30 CFR 75.1714) require 
that each person in an underground coal mine wear, carry, or 
have immediate access to a device that provides respiratory 
protection with an oxygen (O2) source for at least 1 hr, as 
approved by the certifying agencies—the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) in Morgantown, WV, 
and the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA).  The 
NIOSH National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory 
(NPPTL) and MSHA are conducting a long-term evaluation of 
SCSRs deployed in underground coal mines.  NPPTL locates 
mines willing to participate in the study and trades deployed 
SCSRs for new ones in cooperation with MSHA.  NPPTL then 
tests the deployed SCSRs. The objective of this program is to 
evaluate the in-mine operational durability of deployed SCSRs. 
Of utmost concern is the successful performance of any SCSR 
that passes its approved inspection criteria. Such apparatus 
must function successfully to enable a miner to escape safely 
during a mine emergency.  Apparatus that fail inspection are 
expected to be removed from service. 
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
 
This study involves testing approximately 100 SCSRs in 
each phase. This report describes findings in the seventh phase 
of testing from May 1999 to August 2000.  Previous reports 
describe phases 1 through 6 [Kyriazi et al. 1986; Kyriazi and 
Shubilla 1992, 1994, 1996, 2000]. Ninety percent of the 
apparatus were tested on a breathing and metabolic simulator 
(BMS) (figure 1) and 10% on human subjects on a treadmill. 
Figure 1.—Breathing and metabolic simulator. 
MSHA supplies some of the human test subjects from its Mine 
Emergency Unit for treadmill testing. 
The SCSRs tested were manufactured by CSE Corp., 
Draegerwerk AG, Mine Safety Appliances Co., Inc. (MSA), and 
Ocenco, Inc. They were sampled according to estimated market 
share (table 1). The apparatus are shown in figures 2 through 6. 
Table 1.—SCSRs collected for evaluation 
Apparatus Market share 
No. received
and tested 
CSE SR-100  . . . . . . . . . .  46  46  
Draeger OXY K-Plus . . . 5 10 
MSA Life-Saver 60  . . . . .  7  11  
Ocenco EBA 6.5 . . . . . . .  39  30  
Ocenco M-20  . . . . . . . . .  
    Total  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
2  10
—  107  
The O2 constant-flow rate is checked on the Ocenco EBA 
6.5, a compressed-O2 apparatus. The NIOSH-required flow is 
1.5 L/min at ambient temperature and pressure (at NIOSH in 
Morgantown, WV), dry (ATPD). 
All apparatus in this study are checked for breathing circuit 
leak tightness after opening. The leak test used is that 
recommended by Draeger for its BG-174A rescue breathing 
Figure 2.—Cased and uncased CSE SR-100 self-rescuer. 
3 
apparatus. It is performed to determine how well the apparatus 
isolates the user from the environment, which may be ir-
respirable in an emergency.  Passing this test is not a require-
ment of the current regulations for these apparatus, however. 
The test permits a decay in breathing circuit pressure from -70 
to -60 mm H2O in 1 min.  We have determined that just passing 
the test is equivalent to a leak rate of approximately 1 mL/min 
given an internal volume for both the apparatus and test stand of 
1 L (all volumes in this report are given at standard temperature 
(0o  C) and pressure, dry, unless otherwise noted).  To give this 
some perspective, an in-leakage rate of 87 mL/min in a 10% CO 
atmosphere at a peak inhalation flow rate of 250 L/min will 
result in the 8-hr threshold limit value (TLV) for CO of 35 ppm. 
The 250 L/min peak inhalation flow rate is used because this 
occurs at roughly an 80 L/min ventilation rate, the highest likely 
such rate that can reasonably be expected of a user. At such a 
maximal work rate, inhalation pressure should not exceed 
-300 mm H2O, the highest negative pressure tolerated by 80% 
of test subjects in a recent study [Hodgson 1993].  At the leak 
test pressure of -70 mm H2O, the proportional in-leakage rate 
resulting in the 8-hr TLV would be 20 mL/min at a peak 
inhalation flow rate of 58 L/min.  The Draeger leak test, 
therefore, can be considered very conservative when applied 
under these circumstances. 
     Figure 3.—Cased and uncased Draeger OXY K-Plus self-
rescuer. 
Figure 4.—Cased and uncased MSA Life-Saver 60 self-rescuer.
Figure 5.—Cased and uncased Ocenco EBA 6.5 self-rescuer. 
Figure 6.—Cased and uncased Ocenco M-20 self-rescuer. 
NPPTL selected the participating mines with regard to type 
of mining operation, coalbed height, and SCSR deployment 
mode in order to obtain a wide range of deployment impact. 
Deployment modes included permanent storage on the ground, 
on a mantrip or mining machine, or belt-worn. 
The BMS test consisted of the average metabolic work rate 
exhibited by the 50th-percentile miner weighing 87 kg while 
performing the 1-hr man test 4 as described in 42 CFR 84. 
However, even though the average work rate is the same, 
NPPTL testing is not equivalent to the certification testing at 
NIOSH-Morgantown.  The certification testing imposes high 
and low work rates that the average, used at NPPTL, does not. 
Also, the stressor levels are continuously monitored at NPPTL, 
whereas they are sampled only between work activities in the 
certification testing. In addition, NPPTL testing continues until 
the apparatus is empty, whereas testing during certification ends 
at a predetermined time—the rated duration—even though the 
capacity of the apparatus usually exceeds this, sometimes 
4 
considerably. Therefore, an apparatus that fails NPPTL testing 
would not necessarily fail certification, and vice versa.  In the 
treadmill testing, the human subjects walked at whatever speed 
and grade resulted in an O2 consumption rate of 1.35 L/min. 
The CO2 production rate, ventilation rate, and respiratory 
frequency varied in the test subjects.  The metabolic parameters 
for both BMS and human subjects are given in table 2. 
Table 2.—BMS and human-subject metabolic parameters 
Metabolic workload BMS Subject A Subject B Subject C 
O2 consumption rate . . . . . . . . . . . . .  L/min . .    1.35      1.35       1.35      1.35
CO2 production rate . . . . . . . . . . . . .  L/min . .    1.15 1.12            1.18      1.00
Ventilation rate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  L/min . .    30.0      27       22 28      
Tidal volume  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  L/breath . .    1.68      1.59       2.20      2.00
Respiratory frequency . . . . . .  breaths/min . .    17.9      17       10 14      
Peak respiratory flow rate:
 Inhalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  L/min . .  













BMS CO2 production rate was lowered in this phase of testing 
to 1.15 L/min from 1.30 L/min in the last two phases to better 
match the average rate of the human test subjects currently used 
in the study. 
The parameters monitored were inhaled levels of CO2 and 
O2, end-of-inhalation wet- and dry-bulb temperatures, and 
inhalation and exhalation peak breathing pressures in both the 
BMS and treadmill testing.  In the BMS testing, however, 
average inhaled levels of gas concentration were measured as 
opposed to the minimum values of CO2 and maximum values of 
O2 in the treadmill testing.  Average inhaled gas levels include 
the effect of apparatus dead space, whereas minimum values of 
CO2, for example, are only the lowest level of gas concentration 
during inhalation. The BMS measures average inhaled values 
by electronically summing all of the CO2 and O2 over each 
inhalation cycle, weighted by the instantaneous flow rate.  The 
BMS also measures minimum inhaled CO2 levels. 
Tests on the BMS were terminated upon exhaustion of 
the O2 supply as indicated by negative pressures reaching 
-200 mm H2O coinciding with an empty breathing bag.  If 
average inhaled CO2 levels exceed 10% or O2 levels fall below 
15%, the accuracy of the metabolism of the BMS becomes 
questionable, and tests were terminated at those points or shortly 
afterward. Treadmill tests were terminated when the O2 supply 
was exhausted, if minimum inhaled CO2 exceeded 4%, if 
maximum inhaled O2 fell below 15%, or if the test subject 
stopped because of subjectively high breathing pressures or 
temperatures. 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test was performed for each 
monitored stressor to determine whether or not the deployed 
units behaved differently from new units.  It tests the hypothesis 
that the two samples are from populations with the same mean. 
The values from both samples are ranked in ascending order of 
magnitude.  If the sum of the ranks of the smaller sample (T) 
(in this case, new units) falls within the acceptable range for the 
given sample sizes, then there is not sufficient evidence at the 
specified probability level (" =.05, two-sided) to say that the 
means of the two samples differ.  The rank-sum test does not 
rely upon the assumptions that either the new- or deployed-unit 
data are normal distributions or that they have identical 
variances, as does the t-test for two populations of independent 
samples.  One limitation of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is that 
it does not distinguish between large and small differences in 
values. The results of the two-sided, " = 0.05, Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests are presented in table 3.  






















SR-100  . . . . . . .  15-60  42  15-60  4  15-60  45  15-60  66  15-60  63  15-60  34  15-60  46  
OXY K-Plus . . . 8-31 25 8-31 22 8-31 29 8-31 22 8-31 24 8-31 22 8-31 18 
Life-Saver 60 . . 9-33 21 9-33 16 9-33 16 9-33 25 9-33 28 9-33 16 9-33 19 
EBA 6.5 . . . . . .  18-75  32  18-75  26  18-75  70  18-75  46  18-75  62  18-75  36  18-75  20  
M-20  . . . . . . . . .  8-31  33  8-31  20  8-31  16  8-31  27  8-31  31  8-31  22  8-31  8  
T ' Sum of the ranks of the smaller sample (new units). 
The probability of T falling 





Experience with each model of apparatus is discussed 
separately.  The minute-average values of the monitored 
stressors were averaged over the entire test duration and are 
presented graphically (figures 7-11) for each apparatus by 
stressor. The values for new units tested on the BMS can be 
compared with those for deployed units tested on the BMS and, 
to some extent, with those for deployed units tested on human 
subjects on a treadmill, which are plotted afterward.  Because 
human subjects may differ from each other and from the BMS 
in terms of CO2 production rate, ventilation rate, and respiratory 
frequency, all of which affect apparatus duration as well as all 
of the monitored stressors, treadmill tests cannot be considered 
equivalent to the BMS tests even though the O2 consumption 
rate is the same.  Missing data points for wet-bulb temperature 
indicate equipment malfunction or inability to instrument 
apparatus. 
CSE SR-100 
In addition to the 40 apparatus targeted for collection in this 
phase, we tested an additional 6 units received from the United 
Mine Workers of America, at their request, for a total of 
46 SR-100s. 
Of 44 deployed units checked for breathing circuit leaks, 
34 passed. Two of the three new apparatus checked for leaks 
passed. 
As in the previous two phases, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
[M=3; N=21] for average inhaled CO2 showed a significant 
difference between new and deployed units, with deployed units 
having higher values than new ones (table 3).  CSE's noise test, 
developed to detect bed degradation, was not being used at the 
mines during the collection of all the apparatus in this phase of 
testing. Therefore, some apparatus were collected that had noise 
levels that would have required them to be removed from 
service.  They were tested anyway to see how they performed. 
In general, the higher the decibel level, the higher the CO2 level; 
however, the correlation coefficient was only 0.51 in this phase 
versus 0.85 for 17 apparatus tested in the previous phase.  We 
have no explanation for this disparity at present but, for the 
apparatus tested here, only when decibel levels were under 34 
was one guaranteed that average inhaled CO2 levels would 
remain under 4% during the life of the unit (figure 12). 
Table 4 shows that 15 of 42 apparatus tested on the BMS 
experienced CO2 breakthrough before expenditure of the O2 
supply; 11 of these occurred before 60 min.  
Table 4.—CSE SR-100 CO2 breakthrough times, minutes 















58 62 6.0 
15 65 12.2 
12 63 10.2 
57 63 6.2 
55 61 7.4 
60 61 4.0 
58 66 9.6 
64 65 4.5 
57 63 5.5 
66 66 4.2 
49 60 8.0 
58 64 7.2 
66 68 4.7 
Deployed:  Human






     CO2 breakthrough for BMS - 4% average inhaled; for treadmill - 4% 
minimum inhaled. 
None of the new 
units experienced premature breakthrough.  The response to 
high inhaled levels of CO2 will be increased ventilation rates in 
most users.  Increased ventilation rates will result in higher 
breathing pressures experienced by the user.  Breathing 
resistance in the SR-100 increases rapidly toward end-of-life 
even in new apparatus, and elevated CO2 levels will only add to 
this. 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test also shows that new units had 
statistically significantly higher wet- and dry-bulb temperatures 
than deployed units.  This may be a reflection of more complete 
reaction of the bed chemicals in new units. 
Three units had no or insufficient starter oxygen, requiring a 
manual start before beginning or shortly after beginning the test. 
There were five instances of either the top, bottom, or both lids 
being particularly hard to remove.  These occurrences were all 
in apparatus manufactured prior to March 1992; a part change 
in late 1994 was designed to prevent this problem.  Two of the 
four units used in human-subject tests caused coughing upon 
donning. One of the test subjects reported burning at the back 
of his throat in addition to coughing.  As a result, 10 breaths 
were exhaled into the unit to wet down the offending dust 
(presumably corn starch, which is used by the manufacturer to 
keep saliva from reaching the chemical bed), after which testing 
continued normally.  Two BMS tests were terminated due to 
breathing pressures that exceeded the range of the pressure 
transducer (700 mm H2O). All of the others were terminated 
with flat bags or high CO2 (table 4). 
DRAEGER OXY K-PLUS 
Two deployed units passed the leak-tightness test and seven 
failed; two new units passed the test and one failed. 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests [M=3; N=9] for the Draeger 
show that new units could not be distinguished from deployed 
units in any measured parameter. 
No deployed or new units experienced CO2 breakthrough. 
No problems were evident in the 10 apparatus from the 
targeted sample.  However, a mine using both CSE SR-100s and 
6 
Figure 7.—CSE SR-100 test results. 
7 
Figure 8.—Draeger OXY K-Plus test results. 
8 
Figure 9.—MSA Life-Saver 60 test results. 
9 
Figure 10.—Ocenco EBA 6.5 test results. 
10 
Figure 11.—Ocenco M-20 test results. 
11 
Draeger OXY K-Pluses decided to try the CSE shake test on its 
Draeger units and found that some of them rattled.  The mine 
expressed concern to MSHA, which asked us to inspect five of 
these apparatus.  We found that some of the apparatus had 
leaked KO2 into the breathing circuit on both sides of the 
canister—inside both the breathing bag and breathing hose. 
Three of these units were missing the metal plates on which are 
written the serial number and manufacturing date, and which 
contain the belt loops. These apparatus, therefore, did not pass 
inspection. Some of the units that had KO2 leakage, however, 
did pass inspection and, as a result, an investigation by NIOSH, 
MSHA, and Draeger was undertaken.  Draeger has developed 
a shake test for the OXY K-Plus. 
Figure 12.—CSE SR-100 DB level versus CO2 level. 
MSA LIFE-SAVER 60 
Nine of the eleven deployed units passed the leak test; all 
three of the new units passed. 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests [M=3, N=10] show that new 
units did not perform differently from deployed units in any 
performance measure. 
No deployed or new units experienced CO2 breakthrough. 
The low oxygen level during the treadmill test (figure 9) was 
caused by a poorly fitting nose clip on the human test subject. 
One unit had a small slit in the breathing bag.  An inspection 
by NIOSH, MSHA, and MSA of approximately 100 units 
produced over the same time period revealed no further similar 
damage.  It was determined that the isolated case was a 
manufacturing defect.  Although the unit behaved normally in 
the BMS test, it must be assumed that any breach in the 
breathing circuit is a serious defect that can admit toxic gases 
into the breathing circuit.  A hole in the breathing bag, however, 
is likely to admit a smaller quantity of ambient air into the 
breathing circuit than a hole in the inhalation hose, for example, 
since the pressure in the bag is usually very close to ambient 
pressure, whereas the inhalation hose will see greater negative 
pressures. 
One deployed unit had a large dent on its lid, which required 
it to be removed from service.  It was tested anyway, however, 
and behaved normally in the BMS test.  All such units that 
escape detection by the mine operator, MSHA, and our own 
inspections are tested to determine if they would have 
performed acceptably.  If they had not been collected as part of 
our study, they could have been used in an emergency situation. 
OCENCO EBA 6.5 
None of the 30 deployed apparatus tested for breathing 
circuit tightness passed the leak test; 1 of the 3 new apparatus 
passed.  Some units passed the test when their relief valves were 
capped, however, which implies backflow leakage through the 
valves. 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests [M=4; N=27] show that, in all 
performance measures, new units could not be distinguished 
from deployed units. 
No deployed or new units experienced CO2 breakthrough. 
The large range of average inhaled O2 level test averages is 
due to the difference in the apparatus O2 regulator flow rates, 
which ranged in this phase from 1.53 to 1.93 L/min ATPD.  The 
O2 concentration in a breathing circuit will rise if the O2 supply 
rate is higher than the O2 consumption rate. 
In this phase, we found two units in which the orange 
cylinder bands had shifted, five units with cracks in their cases, 
and one unit with a blown-out case gasket.  Any of these signs 
require the apparatus to be removed from service.  In one unit 
with a case crack, the O2  flow was so high that the cylinder 
emptied in 59 min.  In this instance, a shorter-than-normal 
duration would have been the only consequence.  Another unit 
with case cracks had a demand valve which, when activated, 
stuck open.  Turning off the cylinder valve closed the demand 
valve; this was done and the test was completed normally.  Had 
this not been done, a severely curtailed duration would have 
resulted in this unit as well. The other units with disqualifying 
damage behaved normally.  What remains of concern is the fact 
that damage requiring these units to be removed from service is 
very difficult to detect when the apparatus are dirty.  The 
apparatus are cleaned after they are procured from the 
participating mines and only then does the damage reveal itself. 
The caution we issue is this: an apparatus caked with dirt 
cannot be properly inspected; dirt hides damage that may be 
critical. 
OCENCO M-20 
Of the nine deployed units tested for leak-tightness, two 
passed; of the three new units, two passed. 
Four deployed and all three of the new apparatus experienced 
average inhaled CO2 levels of 4% before exhaustion of the O2 
supply (table 5). In all but one instance, however, the depletion 
of the O2 supply was only 1 min or less away.  One apparatus 
experienced CO2  breakthrough at minute 5 with a final duration 
of 18 min, at which time the average inhaled CO2 had reached 
7.5%. This unit also had a noticeable quantity of lithium 
hydroxide (LiOH) in the breathing bag and a lower-than-normal 
O2 flow rate, as evidenced by continuous demand valve use. 
The continuous use of the demand valve would have been of no 
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import to a user since a high work rate would also require 
continuous use of the demand valve.  The LiOH dust in the 
breathing bag also would not have affected a user since none 
was found in the mouthpiece, but the higher CO2 values might 
have caused a higher ventilation rate in a user.  It is likely that 
the LiOH in the breathing bag is evidence of chemical bed 
deterioration caused by physical impact from deployment (belt 
wear), which resulted in the higher CO2 values. Environmental 
simulation tests [Kyriazi 1996] showed similar results of LiOH 
escaping the chemical bed.  NIOSH, MSHA, and Ocenco are 
currently investigating the problem. 
Table 5.—Ocenco M-20 CO2 breakthrough times, minutes 








Deployed:  BMS  . . . .  17  18  4.4  
5 18 7.
17 17.5 4.5 
16 17 4.8 
New:  BMS  . . . . . . . .  19  19  4.1  
18 19 5.0 
18 19 4.5
 5
 CO2 breakthrough for BMS - 4% average inhaled; for treadmill -
4% minimum inhaled.
 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test [M=3; N=9] revealed that 
durations for deployed units were statistically significantly 
lower than those for new units. This could be caused by gas 
leakage 
from the cylinders or higher regulator flow rates in the deployed 
units. All of the apparatus had cylinder pressures in the 
acceptable (green) range. Since checking the cylinder gauge is 
one of the inspection criteria, apparatus having significantly low 
pressures would presumably be removed from service and 
would not present a serious problem.  Also, since the durations 
of deployed units were only 2 min lower than those of new units 
(17 versus 19 min), this finding is not viewed with concern at 
present, but will be monitored for greater effects in future 
phases of this study. 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test also showed that dry-bulb 
temperatures for new units may be statistically significantly 
higher than those for deployed units and that exhalation 
pressures for new units may be statistically significantly lower 
than those for deployed units.  Dry-bulb temperatures of new 
units that are higher than those for deployed units may indicate 
lower rea ctivity of the chemical bed in deployed units. 
However, since CO2 levels were the same for new and deployed 
units, this finding is of no concern.  Higher exhalation pressures 
for deployed units might indicate powdering of the chemical 
beds. However, since the pressures for new and deployed units 
were found to be so similar (see figure 11), this finding can be 
ignored and is attributable to the rank-sum test's inability to 
distinguish between large and small differences in values. 
Several M-20s had dirt migration into the cases, which 
indicates breaches in the case seals.  One unit was missing its 
top bumper pad, which indicates rough usage.  However, all of 
these apparatus performed normally. 
CONCLUSIONS
 
The results of this study suggest that the large majority of 
SCSRs that pass their inspection criteria can be relied upon to 
provide a safe level of life support capability for mine escape 
purposes.  However, the mining environment seems to have 
caused some performance degradation in the CSE SR-100, 
Draeger OXY K-Plus, and Ocenco M-20.  CSE has added a 
shake test to its inspection criteria in order to detect damage 
to the SR-100 chemical bed, which results in early CO2 
breakthrough. Several Draeger OXY K-Pluses were found with 
significant quantities of chemical in both the mouthpiece side of 
the breathing circuit and the breathing bag.  As a consequence, 
Draeger developed a shake test to detect such damage.  One 
Ocenco M-20 was found with chemical in the breathing bag; 
this unit also experienced early CO2  breakthrough and is 
presently under investigation. The MSA Life-Saver 60 was only 
r e c e n t l y 
introduced into the mines and has not been observed to suffer 
any hidden damage.  The Ocenco EBA 6.5 is not belt-worn; it is 
thus spared from the greater degree of impact brought by belt 
wear. The greatest problem we have seen with it over the years 
is that, because the outer case is so tough, a severe impact may 
result in only a small crack that is not easily visible, especially 
if concealed by dirt. Such severe impact, however, may result 
in critical internal damage, which can compromise successful 
use of the device.  Examples from past phases are damaged 
demand valves with high flow rates resulting  in low durations; 
demand valves with cracked housing permitting in-leakage 
of ambient air; and damaged canisters resulting in LiOH spilling 
into the breathing circuit. Because of the importance of easy 
visual inspection, it is recommended that deployed apparatus 
of all types be cleaned of mine dirt for their regular inspections. 
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Cooperating mine or MSHA office 
Location
Mining company Mine name 
MSHA District 2:
   MSHA inspectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
   Cyprus Emerald Resources Corp.  . . . . .  
MSHA District 3:
   Anker West Virginia Mining Co.  . . . . . . .  
   Wayne Processing, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
   Coastal Coal/West Virginia LLC  . . . . . .  
 Dana Mining Co., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
   BJM Coal Co.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
MSHA District 4: 
   MSHA inspectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
   Speed Mining, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
   Quality Energy, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
   Ambush Mining Co., Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . .  
MSHA District 5:
   Falcon Coal Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
MSHA District 6:
   Husky Coal Co., Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
MSHA District 7:
   Leeco, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
MSHA District 8:
   Black Beauty Underground, Inc. . . . . . .  
   Old Ben Coal Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
   Peabody Coal Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
   White County Coal Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . .  
   Catlin Coal Co., Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
—
Emerald Mine No. 1  . . . . .
Stony River Mine  . . . . . . .
Sentinel Mine  . . . . . . . . . .
Whitetail Mine  . . . . . . . . . .
Prime No. 1 Mine  . . . . . . .
Mine 9A  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
—
Still Run No. 4 Mine . . . . .
Mine No. 1  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Caretta No. 1 Mine  . . . . . .
Mine No. 4  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mine No. 7  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mine No. 68  . . . . . . . . . . .  
 Air Quality No. 1 Mine  . . .
 Zeigler No. 11 Mine  . . . . .
Marissa Mine   . . . . . . . . . .
 Pattiki Mine  . . . . . . . . . . .
Riola Mine  . . . . . . . . . . . .
  Ruff Creek, PA.
  Waynesburg, PA.  
  Mount Storm, WV.
  Philippi, WV.
  Kingwood, WV.
  Morgantown, WV.
  Summersville, WV. 
 Mount Hope, WV.
  Beckley, WV.
  Princeton, WV.
  Caretta, WV.  
  Grundy, VA. 
  Ashcamp, KY.  
  London, KY. 
  Evansville, IN.
  Courterville, IL.
  Marissa, IL.
  Henderson, KY.
  Catlin, IL.  
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